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I.

INTRODUCTION

The question whether international law permits the use of force not
in response to existing violence but to avert future attacks has taken on
added significance in the aftermath of the events of September 11,
2001 and with the debate about Iraqi weaponry. Referring both to the
threat of terrorist attack and the dangers posed by "rogue States", the
National Security Strategy document, issued by President Bush in
September 2002, warns:
The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.
The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor
should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where
the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.
The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the
United States or our allies and friends. The reason for our actions will be clear,
the force measured, and the cause just.'

Nor have such sentiments been confined to the U.S. administration.
Members of the Australian government, for example, have called for a
reconsideration of the U.N. Charter provisions on self-defense to permit
greater latitude for pre-emptive action.2
To some commentators, such statements are symptomatic of a
disturbing willingness on the part of certain governments to disregard
international law; others see them as indications of the need for a
fundamental reconsideration of that law-possibly even including an
amendment of the U.N. Charter-to meet a wholly new type of threat.
Before embracing either school of thought, however, it is appropriate to
examine whether, and if so under what circumstances, existing
international law permits the use of force to prevent an attack that has
not yet materialized. To that end, Part II. of this Article will review the
legal framework on the use of force and suggest that there are cases in
I. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, 15-16 (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Senator Robert Hill, The John Bray Memorial Oration, 4, 6-8 (Nov.
28, 2002), available at http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2002/694281102.doc
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003); Doorstop
Interview, 4-5 (Nov. 28, 2002), at
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm?CurrentlD=-2120; see also Interview
by Neil Mitchell with Prime Minister John Howard, 5-6 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2002/interview20l3.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
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which the use of "pre-emptive force" may be justified, provided that
certain important conditions are satisfied. Parts III. and IV. will then
apply this analysis to the two cases that have focused attention on the
whole issue of pre-emptive action, namely, the threat from international
terrorism (Part III.) and the situation in Iraq (Part W.). The writer's
conclusions are summarized in Part V.
At the outset, however, it is important to sound three notes of caution.
First, there is no agreement regarding the use of terminology in this field.
As a result, some commentators distinguish between "anticipatory"
military action (which they generally use to describe military action
against an imminent attack) and "pre-emptive" force (normally
employed to describe the use of force against a threat that is more remote
in time). Although this approach offers the appearance of precision, the
appearance is deceptive because so many others use the two terms
interchangeably. Statements about "pre-emptive" or "anticipatory" action
need, therefore, to be treated with some caution. The present Article tries
to avoid treating such words as though they were terms of art.
Secondly, publication deadlines meant that this Article was written at
the end of January 2003, at the time that that the chief weapons inspector,
Dr. Hans Blix, and the Director-General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, made their first reports to the
U.N. Security Council on the extent of Iraqi compliance with Security
Council resolution 1441 (2002). 3 The proofs of the Article were revised
on March 22, 2003, three days after the United States, United Kingdom,
and other States commenced military operations against Iraq. While it has
been possible to take account in the text of some developments between
late January and the outbreak of fighting in mid-March 2003, it has not
been possible to discuss these developments in detail or to amend the
footnotes to give full references to the relevant documentation.4
Finally, it is of course well-established that the use of force in
international relations is lawful only if it satisfies two requirements. The
recourse to force, and the degree of force employed, must be lawful
under the legal regime codified in the U.N. Charter (the ius ad bellum).

3. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4692nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692 (2003), at http://odsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/224/61/PDF/N0322461.pdfOpenElement [hereinafter

U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692].
4. The United Kingdom Government Papers,
IRAQ:

IRAQ

(Cm 5769, Feb. 2003); and

UN DOCUMENTS OF EARLY MARCH 2003 (Cm 5785, Mar. 2003) contain invaluable

collections of the later documents.

In addition, the conduct of hostilities must meet the requirements of
international humanitarian law (the ius in bello).5 Space, however, does
not permit discussion of the ius in bello here and the present Article is
therefore confined to ius ad bellum questions.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There is broad agreement on the main principles that make up the
international law on the use of force. The starting point is the Preamble to
the U.N. Charter, which affirms that the "Peoples of the United Nations"
are "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind", and
Article 1(1), which gives, as the first purpose of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

These provisions make clear the importance, in the legal order embodied
in the Charter, of maintaining international peace but also the readiness
to use force to combat aggression and to prevent threats to the peace
from materializing into acts of aggression or breaches of the peace-the
Charter is about keeping the peace not about pacifism.
Article 2(4) then introduces into international law the most far-reaching
limitation ever adopted on the use of force by States against one another:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

This provision was an innovation in 1945 and is cast in terms of an
obligation binding only upon Members of the United Nations, but it has
long been recognized as stating a principle that has become part of
customary international law and, indeed, a rule of ius cogens, binding all
States.6 Although it has sometimes been suggested that it states only a partial

prohibition and that some instances of recourse to force between States fall
wholly outside its scope, 7 this is very much a minority view and most States
5. See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship of lus ad Bellum and lus in
Bello, 9 REV. INT'L STUD. 221 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
99-100 (June 27).
7. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear
Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983).
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and commentators treat Article 2(4) as prohibiting all use of force by one
State against another, or on the territory of another, unless that use of force
is justified by one of the limited exceptions provided for in international law.
The Charter expressly provides for two such exceptions: military
action in self-defense, the right to which is preserved by Article 5 1, and
military action taken or authorized by the U.N. Security Council under
the collective security provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. 9
This section will focus on two questions. First, to what extent, if at all,
does either the right of self-defense or the collective security powers of
the Security Council permit military action to avert a threat that has not
yet materialized in the form of actual violence? Secondly, do these powers
permit a military reaction against threats emanating from terrorist groups
or are they confined to threats from States?
A.

Self-Defense

The right of self-defense is not created by the Charter-it is a
customary law right of some antiquity and is said to be inherent in the
concept of Statehood-but the conditions for its exercise are mostly to
be found in the provisions of Article 51, which states that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United

Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The exercise of the right of self-defense is not subject to any requirement
of prior authorization by the U.N. Security Council; it is an aspect of the
sovereignty of the State (although subject to the limitations imposed by
8.

See Bush, supra note 1, at 15; IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112 (1963); D.W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 112-13 (1958); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
110 (1991). For discussion of these issues see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-

DEFENCE (3rd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
9. The present writer is one of those who asserts that there is also a right to take
military action in extreme cases of humanitarian need, such as that which existed in
Kosovo in 1999; see the writer's evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, reproduced as Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the NATO
Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 926 (2000).

international law, as will be seen). Self-defense may be individual (in
response to an armed attack upon the State exercising the right) or
collective (where a State or group of States go to the assistance of a State
that is the victim of an armed attack, even though they have not
themselves been attacked and are not directly threatened).' 0
It is noteworthy that Article 51 preserved the "inherent right" of selfdefense, rather than creating a right, which otherwise would not have
existed. Moreover, it was a comparatively late addition to the Charter,
for most States initially assumed that "the right of self-defense was
inherent in the proposals and did not need explicit mention in the
Charter"." The customary law status of the right of self-defense and the
close relationship between the customary principle and the provisions of
Article 51 have been confirmed by the International Court and are not a
matter of controversy.' 2 That provision does not, however, state all of
the requirements for a lawful resort to force in self-defense, for it is
generally agreed that, to be lawful, the use of force must not exceed
what is necessary and proportionate in self-defense.
1. Self-Defense Against ThreatenedAttacks
Although Article 51 refers to the right of self-defense "if an armed
attack occurs", the United Kingdom 13 and the United States 14 have
consistently maintained that the right of self-defense also applies when
an armed attack has not yet taken place but is imminent. This view of
self-defense can be traced back to the famous Caroline incident of
1837. 15 That incident involved action taken by U.K. forces in Canada
against the Caroline, a merchant vessel that was being used by Canadian
rebels and their American supporters in attacks against Canada. British
forces attacked the Caroline while she was on the U.S. side of the Great
Lakes and destroyed her, killing some members of her crew. One of the
British officers involved, a Lieutenant McLeod, was subsequently
arrested in the United States on charges of murder arising out of the
incident. The British government maintained that its forces had acted in

10. For the limits of the right of collective self-defence see Military and
Paramilitary (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 6, at 104-06.
11. United Kingdom Commentary on the United Nations Charter, Cmd. 6666, at 9.
12. Military and Paramilitary (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 6, at 102-03.
13. See, e.g., the statements by the U.K. government regarding the 1986 attack by
the United States on Libya, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 494, 639-41 (1986).
14. See, e.g., the statements by the U.S. government at the time of its attack on
Libya, Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 1980-88 DIGEST § 1 at 3405-06.
15. The correspondence between the two governments is set out in 2 J.B. MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 412-29 (1906); 29 B.F.S.P. 1137-38; 30 B.F.S.P. 195-96.
See also R.Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
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exercise of the right of self-defense and demanded McLeod's release.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster's reply has long been regarded as a
definitive statement of the right of self-defense in international law.
Webster recognized that the right of self-defense did not depend upon
the United Kingdom having already been the subject of an attack but
accepted that there was a right of anticipatory self-defense in the face of
a threatened armed attack, provided that there was "a necessity of selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation.' 16 McLeod was subsequently released. The
Caroline test was applied by the International Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg 17 and Tokyo.18 This suggests that a right of anticipatory selfdefense against imminent threats of armed attack was part of the
customary law right preserved by Article 51 of the Charter.
Practice 19 since 1945 (though not always unequivocal by any means)
tends to support that conclusion and confirms that the right of selfdefense in the Charter era continues to include a right to use force to
avert imminent armed attack. The practice of the United Kingdom and the
United States has already been mentioned. As Sir Derek Bowett has
pointed out, even the Soviet Union, which was initially strongly opposed
to any concept of anticipatory self-defense, itself relied on such a right at
various times.20 Two particularly revealing instances of State recognition
of a right of anticipatory self-defense are the debates in the Security
Council on the 1967 six-day war between Israel and the Arab States, as
well as the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor.
In the first case, although Israel's recourse to force against Egypt has
sometimes (unconvincingly) been explained as a response to an actual
attack or as the exercise of belligerent rights stemming from a war that

16.

Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S. Fox (Apr. 24, 1842), 29 BRIT. AND

FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857), quoted in LORI DAMROSCH, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 923 (2001).
17. 13 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 203, 210; International Military

Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947);
Cmd. 6964, at 28-30.
18. See International Military Tribunal at Tokyo (1948), in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029, 1157-59 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).

19. There has been no conclusive statement by the International Court of Justice
on this subject. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra
note 6, at 99-100 (noting that the question of anticipatory self-defense did not arise on
the facts of the case and expressly left the matter open).
20. D.W. Bowett, The Use of Forcefor the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 39,40, n.8 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986).

had not formally been terminated, as Professor Franck has indicated,
Israel's "words and actions clearly asserted a right of anticipatory selfdefence against an imminent armed attack".2 l In Professor O'Brien's
words, it was "a model case for anticipatory self-defense". 22 Moreover,
the international reaction suggests that this claim struck a chord with
other States. A Soviet draft resolution, which would have condemned
Israel for an unlawful resort to force, achieved only four votes in the
Security Council and was thus roundly defeated. 23 In the General
Assembly, a similar resolution was also voted down.24 The reaction of
other States led Franck to conclude:
[Israel's] attack on Egypt was in anticipation of an armed attack, not a reaction
to it. Most States, on the basis of the evidence available to them, did however
apparently conclude that such an armed attack was imminent, that Israel had
reasonably surmised that it stood a better chance of survival if the attack were
pre-empted, and that, therefore, in the circumstances, it had not acted
unreasonably. This does not amount to an open-ended endorsement of a general
right to anticipatory self-defence, but it does recognize that, in demonstrable
circumstances of extreme necessity, anticipatory self-defence
may be a
25
legitimate exercise of a State's right to ensure its survival.

Although international reaction to the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear
reactor, on the other hand, was generally condemnatory of Israel,26 in most
cases that reaction was based on a conclusion that Israel had failed to
demonstrate that there was an imminent threat from Iraq and had thus
failed to satisfy the Caroline requirements for anticipatory self-defense,
rather than on any rejection of anticipatory self-defense as such.27 Indeed,
the emphasis on this failure to demonstrate the existence of an imminent
threat tends, if anything, to confirm the existence of a right of self-defense
in cases where such an imminent threat was shown to exist.
Academic opinion on this question is divided. Brownlie, 28 Gray, 29 and
Henkin, 30 among others, have argued that there is no right of selfdefense until an armed attack has actually commenced. Dinstein 31 also
21. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 103 (2002); but see GRAY, supra
note 8, at 112.
22. WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 133 (1981).
23. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 190.
24. A/L.521 was rejected on July 4, 1967 by seventy-one votes against to twentytwo in favor, with twenty-seven abstentions. G.A. Draft Res. A/L.521, U.N. GAOR. 5th
Emergency Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6717 (1967). For vote verification see 1967
U.N.Y.B. 209, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I. 1.
25. FRANCK, op. cit., supra note 21, at 105.
26. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487
(1981) (adopted unanimously, condemning the Israeli action).
27. FRANCK, op. cit., supra note 21, at 105-07.
28. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 257-76.
29. GRAY, supra note 8, at 112.
30.

31.

Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-44 (1979).
DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 182.
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rejects anticipatory self-defense but accepts that there is a right of
"interceptive self-defense", where a State has "committed itself to an
armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way", an approach that differs
but little from that in the Caroline case. On the other hand, in addition
to Franck (whose work has already been cited), Waldock,32
Fitzmaurice, 33 Bowett, 34 Schwebel, 35 and Jennings and Watts 36 have all
argued that there is a right of anticipatory self-defense against an
imminent armed attack. 7 The position is, perhaps, best summed up by
Judge Higgins, who said:
[In a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous
provision in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate
before it can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this
would also seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right of
self-defence. It is the potentially devastating consequences of prohibiting selfdefence unless an armed attack has already occurred that leads one to prefer this
interpretation-although it has to be said that, as a matter38of simple construction
of the words alone, another conclusion might be reached.

In the present writer's opinion, this view accords better with State practice
and with the realities of modem military conditions than with the more
restrictive interpretation of Article 51, which would confine the right of
self-defense to cases in which an armed attack had already occurred.
Nevertheless, that practice also shows that the right of anticipatory
self-defense is confined to instances where the armed attack is
imminent. Not only was this limitation a central feature of the Caroline
correspondence, it was the basis on which the Nuremberg Tribunal,
while affirming the Caroline test, rejected the defense plea that the
German invasion of Norway had been an act of anticipatory self-defense.
It was also the basis for rejection of the Israeli claim in the reactor case.
In so far as talk of a doctrine of "pre-emption" is intended to refer to a
broader right of self-defense to respond to threats that might materialize
at some time in the future, such a doctrine has no basis in law.

32. 81 RC (1952-II) 496-98.
33.
92 RC(1957-II) 171.
34. BOWETT, supra note 8, at 187-92.
35.
136 RC (1972-II) 478-83.
36. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
37. Waldock, Schwebel, and Jennings are all past Presidents of the International
Court of Justice; Fitzmaurice was a Judge of that Court.
38.

ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How

WE USE IT 242 (1994).

In assessing what constitutes an imminent armed attack, however, it is
necessary to take into account two factors that did not exist at the time of the
Caroline incident. The first is the gravity of the threat. The threat posed by
a nuclear weapon, or a biological or chemical weapon, if used against a city,
is so horrific that it is in a different league from the threats posed (as in the
Caroline) by cross-border raids conducted by men armed only with rifles.
Where the threat is an attack by weapons of mass destruction, the risk
imposed upon a State by waiting until that attack actually takes place
compounded by the impossibility for that State to afford its population any
effective protection once the attack has been launched, mean that such an
attack can reasonably be treated as imminent in circumstances where an
attack by conventional means would not be so regarded. The second
consideration is the method of delivery of the threat. It is far more difficult
to determine the time scale within which a threat of attack by terrorist means
would materialize than it is with threats posed by, for example, regular
armed forces. These would be material considerations in assessing whether,
in any particular case, an attack should be treated as imminent.
Nevertheless, the requirement that the attack be imminent cannot be
ignored or rendered meaningless. Even when taking into account the issues
considered in the preceding paragraph, the right of self-defense will
justify action only where there is sufficient evidence that the threat of
attack exists. That will require evidence not only of the possession of
weapons but also of an intention to use them.
2.

Self-Defense Against Threatsfrom Terrorists

In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, it is also necessary
to ask whether the concept of "armed attack" in Article 51 of the Charter is
capable of including a terrorist attack. The concept of "armed attack" is, it
is true, generally used with reference to the employment of regular armed
forces by states. There is, however, no a priorireason why the term should
be so confined. There is no doubt that terrorist acts by a state can constitute
an armed attack and thereby justify a military response. 39 The U.N. General
Assembly included certain types of terrorist activity committed by States in
its definition of aggression in 1974.40 Similarly, the International Court of Justice,
in its judgment in the Nicaragua case in 1986, considered that covert military
39. For a discussion of this issue see Christopher J. Greenwood, InternationalLaw and
the United States' Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 933, 939-45 (1987)
(discussing whether pre-emptive force against anticipated terrorist attacks is justifiable).
40. G.A. Res. 1334, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 1334]. Article 3 lists a series of acts that are to be considered
as aggression and includes, in sub-paragraph (g), "the sending by or on behalf of a state of
armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another
state of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed [earlier in the paragraph]."
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action by a state could be classified as an armed attack if it was of sufficient
gravity.4 The level of violence employed on September 11, 2001 undoubtedly
reached that level of gravity. There is, therefore, no doubt that had those attacks
been the work of a state, rather than a terrorist organization like Al-Qaida, they
would have been classified as an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51
and the right of self-defense. It would be a strange formalism that regarded the
right to take military action against those who caused or threatened such
actions as dependent upon whether or not their acts could be imputed to a state.
There is, however, no reason to think that international law adopts such
a formalistic approach. On the contrary, the famous Caroline dispute,4
itself shows that an armed attack need not emanate from a state. The
threat in the Caroline case came from a non-state group of the kind most
would probably call terrorist today. The United States was not supporting
the activities of that group and certainly could not be regarded as
responsible for their acts. Yet, nowhere in the correspondence or in the
subsequent reliance on the Webster formula on self-defense is it suggested
that this fact might make a difference and that the Webster formula might
not apply to armed attacks that did not emanate from a state.
The international reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 confirms the
commonsense view that the concept of armed attack is not limited to State
acts. The U.N. Security Council, in its resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001),
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, expressly recognized the
right of self-defense in terms that could only mean it considered that terrorist
attacks constituted armed attacks for the purposes of Article 51 of the
Charter,43 since it was already likely, when these resolutions were adopted,
that the attacks were the work of a terrorist organization rather than a state.
Moreover, the Security Council's subsequent characterization of those acts as
"armed attacks" was echoed by other international bodies. Thus, the North
Atlantic Council, the governing body of NATO, stated on September 12, 2001:
If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United

States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the 4allies
in
4
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

41.
42.
43.

Military and Paramilitary (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 6, at 102-03.
See text accompanying supra notes 15-18.
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., pmbl. & para. 3, U.N.

Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., pmbl. &
para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 373 (2001) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1373].
44. Press Release, North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topicallpol/teffor/O1091205.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).

The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting in
consultation, likewise invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance in declaring that "these terrorist attacks against the
United States of America are attacks against all American States".
B.

Collective Security

The power of the Security Council to take military action is based on Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. For the Council to exercise its powers under this
Chapter it must first make a determination under Article 39, which provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 45with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.

Once the Council has made such a determination, it can take decisions
binding on all Member States of the United Nations.46 Those decisions
may require States to take non-military measures, such as the imposition
of sanctions. 47 They may also require States to take actions such as
withdrawal from territory occupied in a conflict,48 surrender of suspects
for trial,49 or disarmament.5 °

The Council may not require States to take military action but it can
authorize them to do so. 51 That power stems from Article 42 of the
Charter, which provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

45. Although Article 39 does not say so, it is clear from the context that references
to "peace and security" mean "international peace and security; see, e.g., the use of that
term in U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
48. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2392th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/660 (1990) (requiring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait).
49. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993) (on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia);
S.C. Res. 1214 U.N. SCOR 53rd Sess., 3952nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214"(1998)
(requiring the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to surrender for trial those responsible for
the attack on the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998).
50. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (1991) (on Iraq, discussed infra in Part IV.) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 687].
51. U.N. Charter art. 43, para. I (stating that States shall conclude agreements with
the United Nations regarding which parts of their armed forces they will make available
to the Security Council for collective security operations has never been implemented).
In the absence of such agreements, the decision whether or not to make forces available
for a collective security operation is entirely in the discretion of each State.
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Although this provision speaks of the Security Council "taking" military
action, it has been used since the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict to authorize military
action by groups of States to restore international peace and security.
1.

Collective Security and Pre-emptive Action

There is no doubt that this power can be used pre-emptively. Indeed,
the reference in Article 39 to "threat to the peace" (as distinct from "breach
of the peace" and "act of aggression") as one of the three grounds on
which the Council could exercise its Chapter VII powers, demonstrates
that pre-emptive action was always intended to be a52 major feature of the
regime of collective security created by the Charter.
Nor does the Charter limit the pre-emptive power of the Security Council to
threats that are "imminent". There is no trace of such a limitation anywhere
in the Charter. On the contrary, the historical background against which the
Charter was drafted-in particular, the importance of the lack of pre-emptive
action against Hitler in the 1930's in contributing to the causes of World War
Two-strongly suggests that the pre-emptive power of the Security Council
was intended to be much more far-reaching than the power of individual
States to take action by way of self-defense against threats of armed attack.
2.

Collective Security and Terrorism

That leaves the question whether the concept of threat to the peace is
broad enough to embrace not only threats emanating from States but also
those created by a terrorist group like Al-Qaida. Although those who
drafted the Charter were undoubtedly (and, given the historical
background, understandably) concerned with threats posed by States,
nothing in the language of Article 39 or the rest of the Charter suggests
that only threats emanating from States can fall within its scope. In
recent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts
of international terrorism, whether or not "State-sponsored", as threats to
the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, even
before September 11, 2001, the Council had characterized as a threat to
international peace and security Libyan support for terrorism, 53 the
52. Jochen A. Frowein, Article 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 720-21, paras. 6,9 (Bruno Simma ed., 2nd ed. 2002).

53. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992); S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3312th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993);
S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 2930th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/i 192 (1998).

attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt,54 and the attacks
on the U.S. embassies in East Africa. 55 Although the first case involved
State action, there was no clear indication of State involvement in either
of the other incidents. In addition, the Council adopted a number of
resolutions condemning international terrorism in general as a threat to
international peace.56
The resolutions adopted by the Council in the aftermath of September
11, 2001 have been unequivocal in their condemnation of international
terrorism and their characterization of it as a threat to international peace
and security, which entitles the Council to exercise its Chapter VII
powers. Resolution 1268 (2001), adopted unanimously on September
12, 2001, expressed the determination of the Council "to combat by all
means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts" and condemned "the horrifying terrorist acts which took place on
1'1 September 2001" as being, "like any act of international terrorism...
a threat to international peace and security". In resolution 1373 (2001),
which was also adopted unanimously, the Council repeated that
characterization and, acting under Article 41 of the Charter, went on to
require States to take extensive measures against the perpetrators and
States suspected of assisting them. In addition, meetings of the Security
Council held at ministerial level in November 2001 and January 2003
adopted declarations on terrorism, which were again based on the
characterization of international terrorism as a threat to international
peace and security.57
It seems clear, therefore, that under the collective security regime in
the U.N. Charter, a State or group of States can be empowered to take
military action to pre-empt threats of military action or terrorist activity
and that the right to take such pre-emptive action is more extensive than
is the case when a State acts in self-defense. It must be remembered,
however, that the power to take action under the collective security
regime can be conferred only by a decision of the Security Council. No
state is entrusted under the Charter with the power to take military action
to preserve or restore international peace and security without such a
decision. In the absence of such a decision, only the more limited power
to act in self-defense-individual or collective-remains.
54. S.C. Res. 1044, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3627th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044 (1996).
55. S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3915th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I189
(1998); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR,54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 1267].
56. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1269 (1999).
57. S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377
(2001); S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4688th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003).
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III. THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
An analysis of the military action which followed September 11, 2001
in the light of the legal framework set out in Part II., the first point to
note is that the United States and its allies consistently based their
justification for military action in Afghanistan, and against Al-Qaida
more generally, on the right of self-defense and not on any collective
security mandate from the Security Council.
The reliance on self-defense is evident in the letters sent by, for example,
the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the
Security Council reporting on the measures that they were taking in
Afghanistan.5 8 On October 7, 2001, the U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, John Negroponte, wrote to the President of the Security Council
"to report that the United States of America, together with other States, has
initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were carried out
against the United States on September 11, 2001".' 9 The letter went on to state
that the United States had "clear and compelling information that the AlQaida organization ...had a central role in the attacks" and further stated
that the United States might find "that our self-defense requires further
actions with respect to other organizations and states". The letter continued:
The attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ongoing threat to the United States
and its nationals posed by the AI-Qaida organization have been made possible
by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it
controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite every
effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban regime
has refused to change its policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, the AlQaida organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack
innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and
interests in the United States and abroad.
In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense, United States armed forces have initiated
actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.
These actions include measures against AI-Qaida terrorist training camps and
military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In carrying out
these actions, the United States is committed to minimizing civilian casualties
and damage to civilian property.
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The second sentence of Article 51 of the Charter
requires states taking action in self-defense to make such reports.
59. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 2001 FROM THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc.

S/2001/946 (2001).

The U.K. chargi d'affaires wrote to the Security Council in similar
terms on the same day. His letter stated that U.K. forces were engaged
in military operations in Afghanistan and continued:
These forces have now been employed and exercised the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defence, recognised in Article 51, following the
terrorist outrage of 11 September, to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the
same source. My Government presented information to the United Kingdom
Parliament on 4 October which showed that Usama bin Laden and his A1-Qaida
terrorist organisation have the capability to execute major terrorist attacks,
claimed credit for past attacks on United States targets, and have been engaged in
a concerted campaign against the United States and its allies. One of the stated aims
is the murder of United States citizens and attacks on the allies of the United States.
This military action has been carefully planned and is directed against Usama bin
Laden's AI-Qaida terrorist organisation and the Taliban regime that is supporting
60
it. Targets have been selected with extreme care to minimise the risk to civilians.

Did the right of self-defense in fact provide a satisfactory legal basis
for military action in Afghanistan? In answering this question, four
issues require examination. First, should the United States and its allies
have obtained Security Council authorization before resorting to force?
The answer is that there is clearly no legal requirement for them to do
so. The right of self-defense preserved by Article 51 of the Charter is
vested in states and its exercise requires no prior permission from the
Security Council. The only sense in which the exercise of the right of
self-defense is dependent upon the Security Council is found in the
provision, in the first sentence of Article 51, that when the Security
Council has "taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security", the right of self-defense lapses. That clause in Article 51
has, however, generally been the subject of restrictive interpretation.6 1
Moreover, although resolution 1373 (2001) adopted a wide range of
non-military measures for the purpose of restoring international peace
and security, the Council expressly reaffirmed the right to self-defense
and thus made clear that it did not regard the resolution
as in any way
62
restricting the United States in the exercise of that right.
Secondly, was the action by the United States and its allies a response
to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51? It has already been
suggested that the concept of armed attack is not limited to State action
and that the attacks of September 11, 2001 undeniably met the
requirement of gravity identified by the International Court of Justice in
60.
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 2001 FROM THE CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/2001/947 (2001).

61.
See generally Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old?: The
invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MODERN L. REV. 153, 164-65 (1992).
62. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 43, at para. 4.
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the Nicaragua case. Nevertheless, the attacks of September 11, 2001,
terrible as they were, took place some weeks before the U.S. military
response was commenced. Self-defense, which is lawful in international
law, has to be carefully distinguished from reprisals, which, if they
involve the use of armed force, are no longer lawful under the U.N.
Charter. The requirement of necessity in self-defense means that it is
not sufficient that force is used after an armed attack, it must be
necessary to repel that attack. The use of force in response to an armed
attack that is over and done with does not meet that requirement and
looks more like a reprisal. The U.S. action has therefore been criticized
for constituting what some consider to have been a reprisal, rather than a
genuine action in self-defense.
That criticism is unconvincing. The events of September 11 cannot be
considered in isolation. Taken together with other events, such as the
attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998 and the attack on
the USS Cole for which Al-Qaida had claimed responsibility, there were
the clearest possible indications of further outrages to come. Moreover,
in these circumstances there seems little difficulty in regarding the threat
of future attacks from Al-Qaida as meeting the criteria of imminence.
That was clearly the view of the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom, whose letters to the Security Council both spoke of
averting future attacks from Al-Qaida. Whatever criticism this may
have evoked from commentators, 63 it appears to have met with no
hostility from states, even from those normally opposed to U.S.
positions. Therefore, as long as the military action in Afghanistan is
viewed as a forward looking measure to prevent an imminent threat from
materializing into violence, rather than as a backward looking act of
retaliation for the events of September 11, 2001, this criterion of selfdefense appears to be satisfied.
Thirdly, did the threat of armed attack from Al-Qaida justify military
action against Afghanistan? This is a more difficult question for several
reasons. Had the relationship between Al-Qaida and the state of
Afghanistan been such that Afghanistan could be held responsible in
international law for the attacks of September 11, and other threats from
Al-Qaida, there would have been no difficulty. The United States would
then have been employing force against the state responsible for past

63. See Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After
II September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002).

armed attacks and the threat of future armed attacks upon it. However,
the criteria for determining the responsibility of a state for the acts of a
private organization are not altogether clear. In the Nicaraguacase, the
International Court held that the relationship between the United States
and the Contra rebel movement in Nicaragua was not close enough to
render the United States responsible for illegal acts committed by the
Contras. The Court held:
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it
would in principle have to be proved that that state had effective control of
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed. °'

That test has largely been adopted by the International Law Commission
in its Articles on State Responsibility, 65 although the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its second decision in
Tadic66 suggests a looser standard. However, the evidence of the
relationship between Al-Qaida and Afghanistan makes it difficult to
conclude that either test had been satisfied.
A further complication is that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was
not recognized as the government of Afghanistan by the United States or
the vast majority of other countries. That, however, makes no
substantial difference. There is no doubt that the Taliban regime was the
de facto government in Afghanistan at the relevant time and that the
state of Afghanistan bore responsibility for its actions.67 The most
important point, however, is that the state of Afghanistan, through the
acts of the Taliban regime, had undoubtedly violated international law in
permitting Al-Qaida to operate from its territory. There is a general duty
under international law for a state not to allow its territory to be used as
a base for attacks on other states, whether by regular armed forces or
terrorists. 68 In addition, Afghanistan violated specific obligations
imposed by the Security Council following the embassy attacks in
1998.69 At the very least, its position was analogous to that of a neutral

64.

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), supra note 6, at 65.

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, art. 8.
65.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES I 10-13 (2002).

66.

International

Criminal

Tribunal

for

the Former

Yugoslavia-Appeals

Chamber: Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1541 (1999).
67. Ridiger Wolfrum & Christiane E. Philipp, The Status of the Taliban: Their
Obligationsand Rights Under InternationalLaw, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UN L. 559 (2002).

68. United Nations General Assembly definition of aggression, resolution 3314
(XXIX), and numerous other resolutions of the Security Council and the General
Assembly bear witness to such a duty.

69.

See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 55; S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,

4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
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state that unlawfully allows a belligerent to mount military operations
from its territory. Even though the neutral is not held responsible for
those operations as such, it exposes itself to the risk of lawful military
action to put a stop to them. Similarly, where a state allows terrorist
organizations to mount concerted operations against other states from its
territory, and refuses to take the actions required by international law to
put a stop to such operations, the victims of those operations are entitled
to take action against those terrorists. The Caroline formula on selfdefense clearly permitted such action and the undoubted changes in
international law since that time have not abolished this aspect of the
right of self-defense.
Because the Taliban regime made it clear
throughout that it would vigorously oppose any foreign forces entering
its territory to root out Al-Qaida bases, it exposed its own forces to
lawful attack in exercise of the right of self-defense.
Finally, the action taken in self-defense needed to be necessary and
proportionate. Faced with the prospect of more attacks as devastating as
those of September 11, it is difficult to see how the United States went
beyond what was necessary. It was also proportionate. Although the
effect of United States and allied intervention in Afghanistan was to
change the balance of the civil war taking place in that country and lead
to the overthrow of the Taliban regime and its replacement by a new
government, it is difficult to see how the intervention could have
succeeded in its aims of removing the Al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan
without going that far. Indeed, there would rightly have been much
criticism of the United States and its allies had their intervention been
accomplished while leaving the people of Afghanistan in the same plight
as they were in beforehand.
The pre-emptive action that the United States and its allies took
against Al-Qaida in Afghanistan was, therefore, a lawful exercise of the
right of self-defense. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that
self-defense would cover every military action that the United States or
an ally might want to take against Al-Qaida (or other terrorist groups) in
other countries. The use of force in Afghanistan fell within the concept
of self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaida was imminent and
because Afghanistan was quite openly affording sanctuary to large
numbers of Al-Qaida personnel. These considerations will not necessarily
be present in every case.

IV. IRAQ 70

The military action against Iraq, which commenced in March 2003
also raises questions about the scope for pre-emptive military action in
international law. Before those questions can be addressed, however, it
is necessary to examine the background to the present situation because
the legal position in 2003 can be understood only in the context of the
actions taken by the U.N. Security Council
over the years since the Iraqi
71
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
A.

The Security Council Resolutions on Iraq

That invasion, which was a flagrant violation of international law, was
condemned by the Security Council in resolution 660 (1990), which
required Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In common with most of the
subsequent resolutions on Iraq, this resolution was adopted under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter and its provisions were therefore legally binding
on Iraq. When Iraq ignored the requirement that it withdraw, the Security
Council adopted a series of further resolutions. For present purposes, the
most important is resolution 678 (1990) by which the Council authorized:
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or
before January 15, 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph I above, the
[earlier Security Council resolutions on Kuwait] to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore internationalpeace and security in the area. (Emphasis added.)

The reference to "all necessary means" was clearly understood to be an
authorization of military action.72 The passage emphasized shows that
that authorization was not limited to the liberation of Kuwait but
included an authority to use all necessary means for the purpose of
restoring peace and security in the area.
The fighting that ensued was brought to an end at the beginning of
March 1991 with the adoption of resolution 686 (1991). In April 1991,
the Council went on to lay down an exhaustive list of requirements Iraq
had to meet as the conditions for a permanent ceasefire. It did so in
resolution 687 (1991), which referred to all of the earlier resolutions on
Iraq, including resolution 678. In paragraph 1 of resolution 687, the
70. For discussion of this topic see Report of the United Kingdom House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against
Terrorism, H.C. (2002-03) No. 196, para. 129-61; Memoranda by Professors Brownlie
and Greenwood reprinted with the Appendices to the report; Judgment of Professor
Vaughan Lowe for the BBC hearing on the legality of use of force against Iraq, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/education/betsie/parser.pl.
71. For a discussion of the 1990-91 conflict with Iraq see Greenwood, supra note 61.
72. Id. at 165-67.
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Council "affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly
changed below to achieve the goals of the present resolution, including a
formal cease-fire." (Emphasis added.) One of those goals (as noted in
preambular paragraph 25) was the restoration of peace and security in the
area, something that had not been brought about simply because Kuwait
had been liberated. Resolution 687 laid out what the Council determined
Iraq had to do to achieve that goal. The Council required that Iraq:
[U]nconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under
international supervision, of:
(a)

all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all

related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and
fifty
73
kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities.

In addition, paragraph 12 of resolution 687 required Iraq "not to
acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon usable material
or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support
or manufacturing facilities related to the above." The onus was on Iraq
to demonstrate that it had complied with these requirements and to that
end the Council established a weapons inspectorate (UNSCOM) and
empowered the IAEA to fulfill the same role as UNSCOM with regard
to Iraq's nuclear program.74 Other provisions of resolution 687 required
Iraq not to commit or support any act of terrorism and not to permit any
terrorist organization to operate from its territory.75
All of these
requirements went directly to what the Council regarded as necessary to
ensure a restoration of peace and security in the area.
Iraq formally accepted these requirements but resolution 687 was
legally binding because of the obligations imposed on Iraq by Article 25
and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, not because of Iraq's acceptance of
the resolution. The resolution was not the equivalent of an agreement.
In fact, Iraq never complied with the ceasefire conditions and was
repeatedly found by the Security Council to be in breach of the
requirements of resolution 687 regarding international peace and
security. For example, resolutions 707 (1991), 949 (1994), 1060 (1996),
73. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 50, at para. 8.
74. The IAEA was charged with responsibility for investigating Iraq's nuclear
weapons program. Responsibility for investigating all other relevant weapons programs
was entrusted to UNSCOM, a body later replaced by UNMOVIC in 1999; see discussion
infra Part IV.A.
75. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 50, at para. 32.

1115 (1997), and 1137 (1997) all condemned Iraqi violations of
provisions of resolution 687. In 1998 the U.N. Secretary-General drew
up a Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq regarding weapons
inspections. The Security Council then, in resolution 1154 (1998) stressed:
[C]ompliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations, repeated again in
the Memorandum of Understanding, to accord immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA in conformity with
the relevant resolutions is necessary for the implementation of resolution 687
(1991), but that any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq.

Nevertheless, Iraq continued to violate its obligations, a fact demonstrated,
for example, by resolution 1205 (1998). After yet another attempt to
resume inspections, UNSCOM reported to the Security Council on
December 15, 1998:
As is evident from this report, Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it
promised on November 14, 1998.
In addition, during the period under review, Iraq initiated new forms of
restrictions upon the Commission's work. Amongst the Commission's many
concerns about this retrograde step is what such further restrictions might mean
for the effectiveness of long-term monitoring activities.
In spite of the opportunity presented by the circumstances of the last month,
including the prospect of a comprehensive review, Iraq's conduct ensured that
no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or
accounting for its prohibited weapons programs.
Finally, in the light of this experience, that is, the absence of full cooperation by
Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded against [sic] that the commission is not able
to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security
Council and, thus, to give the
76 assurances it requires with respect to Iraq's
prohibited weapons programs.

This report was followed by the withdrawal of the UNSCOM inspectors
and a period of military action (Operation Desert Fox) by the United
Kingdom and United States against targets in Iraq connected with
unlawful Iraqi weaponry." Resolution 1284 (1999) replaced UNSCOM
with a new body, UNMOVIC, and required that Iraq allow UNMOVIC
unrestricted access. Iraq, however, refused to permit UNMOVIC to
operate within Iraq until it suddenly changed tack in September 2002
and agreed that the inspectors could return.
76. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 15 DECEMBER 1998 FROM THE
SECRETARY GENERAL, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N.
Doc. S/1998/1172 (1998).
77. See United Kingdom Statement at U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3939th mtg., at 10,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3939 (1998), at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N98/863/
20/PDF/N9886320.pdf?OpenElement. Operation Desert Fox should not be confused
with the quite separate Anglo-American actions to maintain "no-fly zones" established in
northern and southern Iraq. The legal basis for the "no-fly zones" is humanitarian action
in support of Security Council resolution 688 (1991). See Christopher Greenwood, Is
there a Right of HumanitarianIntervention?, 39 WORLD TODAY 34 (Feb. 1993).
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It was against this background that the Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 1441 (2002) on November 8, 2002. That resolution
again expressly recalled resolution 678 (1990) and deplored the fact that
Iraq had not complied with resolution 687 (1991). The Council recalled that
resolution 687 had stated that "a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by
Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq
contained therein." 78 The resolution then stated that the Council:
Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under
relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's
failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to
complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991).79

The term "material breach" has a special meaning in the law of treaties.
In Article 60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,
material breach is defined as:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or,
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of the treaty.

At the Security Council meeting that adopted resolution 1441, Ireland stated
that it understood the term "material breach" in the resolution to have the
meaning set out in this Article.8 ° Of course, resolution 687 is not a treaty
but a unilateral act of the Security Council, more akin to a legislative
instrument, which binds Iraq irrespective of its agreement. However, it is
unlikely that anything will turn on this point. The object and purpose of
resolutions 687 and 1441 is plainly to restore international peace and
security and a material breach of its terms is therefore one that involves a
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of that object. That
includes the possession by Iraq of prohibited weapons, or the failure to
cooperate actively with the inspectors, because the inspection mechanism is
itself essential to the accomplishment of the purpose of the resolution. As a
leading text on the law of treaties has stated, "material breach" is not the
same as "fundamental breach" but can include the breach of an important
81
ancillary provision such as one providing for monitoring and verification.
78. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1441 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1441].
79. Id. at para. 1.
80.

U.N. SCOR 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., at 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (2002), at

http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/680/99/PDF/N0268099.pdf?OpenElement.
81. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 238 (2000) (referring to
the inspection provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention).

The Council, however, decided "to afford Iraq ...a final opportunity
to comply with its disarmament obligations" under resolution 687 and
the other resolutions. 82 Iraq was required to submit "a currently
accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to
develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and
other delivery systems" as well as allow unrestricted access to inspectors
from UNMOVIC and the IAEA.83 The Council decided:
[Tihat false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq
pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and
cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a
further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported
84 to the Council
for assessment in accordance with paragraphs II and 12 below;
...further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any
representative or personnel of the United Nations or the 85IAEA or of any
Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution.

Paragraph 9 required Iraq to cooperate "immediately, unconditionally
and actively". In the event of Iraqi non-compliance, paragraphs 11 to 13
of the resolution provided that the Council:
11.
Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General
of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with
inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament
obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
12.
Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance
with paragraphs 4 or II above, in order to consider the situation and the need
for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to
secure international peace and security;
13.
Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.

Resolution 1441 was based on a draft resolution sponsored by the
United Kingdom and the United States. The draft was the subject of
extensive informal consultations over a period of weeks before any text
was made public. It is, therefore, impossible to be certain what changes
may have been made in these informal negotiations or what
understandings expressed about the meaning of different provisions in the
resolution.
A draft resolution, which reflected these informal
consultations, was published on November 6, 2002.86 The text finally
adopted differed from that draft in that the reference in paragraph 12 of the
draft to the Council meeting "in order to consider the situation and the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 3.
Id. at para. 4.
Id. at para. 8.
U.N. SECURITY

COUNCIL, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DRAFT RESOLUTION, U.N. Doc.

S/2002/1198 (2002).
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need for full compliance with all of the relevant resolutions in order to
restore international peace and security" was changed by substituting the
word "secure" for "restore". It has been suggested that this change
weakens the argument that the resolution could provide an authority for
the use of force because the change meant that the language of the
resolution no longer tracked so closely the language of resolution 678
(1990).87 The minor alteration in the language, however, seems a very
slender basis for any such conclusion.
As required by resolution 1441, Iraq produced on December 7, 2002 a
declaration relating to all its relevant weapons programs. It also admitted
teams of inspectors from UNMOVIC and the IAEA. On January 27, 2003,
the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, and the DirectorGeneral of the JAEA, Mr. Mohammed El Baradei presented reports to the
Security Council detailing the activities and findings of their teams during
the first sixty days of inspections. 8 Dr. Blix's report showed that Iraq was
still not in compliance with resolution 1441 and the other relevant
resolutions. Although noting that Iraq had generally cooperated in terms of
access (though he noted some problems), Dr. Blix found Iraq's cooperation
on matters of substance wanting. Iraq had not provided the kind of active
cooperation that resolution 1441 required; in particular, Iraq had not
volunteered evidence from which unresolved questions about weaponry
raised in previous inspections might be resolved. Specifically, Dr. Blix
expressed concern about:
(1) evidence that Iraq had made greater progress in purifying
and weaponizing VX nerve gas than it had admitted; 89
(2) documents relating to the use of chemical bombs in the IranIraq war, which suggested that some 6500 chemical bombs, with
approximately 1000 tonnes of chemicals, were unaccounted for; 90
(3) the discovery of a small number of chemical rocket
warheads, which highlighted the issue of rockets, had not been
accounted for; 9'

87. Frederic Kirgis, Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity
to Comply with Disarmament Obligations, ASIL INSIGHTS, Nov. 2002, available at

http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh92.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
88. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 3.
89. Id. at 5.
90.

Id.

91.

Id.

(4) indications that Iraq had produced more anthrax than it had
declared and that it might have retained some bacterial growth
92
media possibly sufficient to produce 5000 liters of anthrax;
(5) evidence that Iraq had continued to develop missiles with a
93
range of more than 150 kilometers;
(6) a discovery of documents in the home of an Iraqi scientist,
which suggested that other documents might, have been placed
94
in private homes so as to make their detection more difficult;
(7) the unwillingness of Iraqi scientists to meet inspectors other
95
than in the presence of Iraqi officials.
The Blix Report also noted that UNMOVIC had built up its capabilities,
which were at the disposal of the Security Council.9 6 Dr. El Baradei also
noted certain matters that his team was investigating but stated that "to
date we have found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons
97
programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s".
Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei briefed the Council again on February
149' and March 7, 2003. 99 In addition, UNMOVIC produced on March 100
6,
2003 a detailed document entitled "Unresolved Disarmament Issues".
Although these reports referred to progress and a number of concessions
on the part of the Iraqi government, they also established that, four
months after the adoption of resolution 1441, Iraq had still not taken all
the steps required to put an end to the continuing breach identified in
paragraph 1 of resolution 1441. At the meeting of the Security Council on
March 7, 2003, when Iraq's representative contended that Iraq had no
weapons of mass destruction and was cooperating fully with the
inspectors,' 0' not one member of the Council agreed that Iraq had yet put
an end to the material breach of resolution 687, which the Council had
earlier identified and most made express statements that Iraq was still in
breach, although there were evident differences about the
02 extent of that
breach and about the best way in which to respond to it. 1
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 12.
98. The briefings are set out in Cm 5769, supra note 4, at 79, 85.
99. The briefings are set out in Cm 5785, supra note 4, at 4, 8.
100. Cm 5785, supra note 4, at 15.
101. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4714, at 34-35.
102. Id. at 9 (Germany), 13 (Mexico), 14 (United States of America), 17 (Russian
Federation), 19 (France), 21 (China), 22 (Chile), 23 (Spain), 25 (United Kingdom), 28
(Angola), 29 (Cameroon), 30 (Bulgaria), 32 (Pakistan), 33-34 (Guinea).

[VOL. 4: 7, 2003]

Pre-emptive Use of Force
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

The differences over whether to resort to force or whether to continue
with the inspections meant, however, that the Council was effectively
deadlocked. By March 16 it had become clear that neither a resolution
that would authorize military action (or one which would be perceived
as doing so) or a resolution that the inspectors should continue with their
work would be adopted. In these circumstances, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and a number of other States decided to take military
action without a further resolution, relying on the authorization granted
by resolution 678 (1990).'03 That action began on March 20, 2003.
B.

The Legality of MilitaryAction Against Iraq

Was that resort to force lawful? This question certainly aroused
controversy with several States expressing the view that it was not, while
others strongly defended the action. °4 In the light of the Blix Reports and
the "Unresolved Issues" document published by UNSCOM,' °5 it is plain
that, at the date military action commenced, Iraq continued to be in
material breach of resolution 1441 (2002) and resolution 687 (1991). The
debate in the Council on March 7, 2003 showed that, with the possible
exception of Syria, all the members of the Council accepted that this was
the case.06 Moreover, that breach was no technicality but meant that, on
the basis of the existing Security Council resolutions, Iraq posed a threat
to international peace and security as determined by the Security Council.
In those circumstances, there is no doubt that the Council could lawfully
have adopted a fresh resolution authorizing military action. Resolution
1441 (2002) did not, in and of itself, constitute such a fresh mandate. The
text of that resolution made clear that any breach by Iraq was to be reported
to the Council, which would then "convene... in order to consider the
situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council

103. The British government's exposition of this argument was set out in an answer by
the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, to a parliamentary question on March 17, 2003, 646
PARE. DEB. H.L. WA 2, and a longer paper on the legal basis for action sent by the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons, at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelemte/
ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1 007029394383&a=KArticle&aid= 1047661460790.
104. See also the differing views expressed in the United Kingdom Parliament, e.g.,
in the debate on the Legality of the Use of Force in the House of Lords on March 17,
2003, 646 PARL. DEB. H.L. WA cols. 68 et seq.
105. See discussion supra note 100.
106. See the statements cited supra note 102.

10 7
resolutions in order 'o secure international peace and security".
Moreover, several States made clear when the resolution was adopted that
there was no "automaticity" involved, 10 8 so that any violation by Iraq would
have to be discussed by the Council before any recourse to force.
A new resolution expressly authorizing military action was not, however,
necessary as a matter of international law. The authorization to use "all
necessary means" contained in resolution 678 (1990) had not been terminated
by the Security Council. On the contrary, as demonstrated above, it was
reaffirmed, as recently as November 2002, in the preamble to resolution 1441
(2002). Contrary to what is frequently suggested,'0 9 resolution 678 was not
solely about the liberation of Kuwait. The authorization for the coalition to
use force went beyond the goal of liberating Kuwait by authorizing military
action for the purpose of restoring international peace and security in the area.
Resolution 687 (1991) then determined that the restoration of
international peace and security required the partial disarmament of Iraq.
Resolution 687, paragraph 1, affirmed Resolution 678 except to the extent
that the other provisions of resolution 687 expressly changed resolution
678. The text of resolution 687 contained nothing that expressly (or
impliedly) indicated that the Council either considered that the mandate
contained in resolution 678 had been discharged or that it could not be
relied upon in the event of Iraq continuing to pose a threat to international
peace and security. The imposition of a ceasefire by resolution 687
(1991) suspended hostilities and thus suspended the authority to use force
but, by reaffirming resolution 678, resolution 687 left open the possibility
of further military action to achieve the objectives of resolution 678 in the
event of Iraqi violation of the ceasefire terms.
It is, of course, true that resolution 678 was not intended to remain in force
indefinitely."l 0 But that fact is not decisive. The same could be said of
resolution 661 (1990) imposing economic sanctions. The Council plainly
intended that neither resolution should remain in force longer than was
necessary to ensure Iraqi compliance with the various resolutions on Kuwait
and to restore peace and security in the area. Following the liberation of Kuwait,
resolution 687 (1991) set out exactly what the Council considered had to be
done by Iraq to ensure that peace and security was restored but Iraq did not do
what was required of it. That resolution 678 (1990) remained in force,
therefore, was due solely to Iraq's persistent violation of its obligations under

107.
108.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 79, at para. 12.
See, e.g., Statement by the United States, S/PV.4644, at 3; Statement by the United

Kingdom, id. at 5. See also U.N. SECURITY

COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER 2002 FROM
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA, FRANCE AND THE RusSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1236 (2002).

109.
110.

See, e.g., answer by Professor Brownlie in response to Question 89, supra note 70.
Lowe, supra note 70, at para. 115.
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resolution 687. Moreover, the recent reaffirmation of resolution 678 (1990) in
the preamble to resolution 1441 (2002) cannot be dismissed as mere verbiage;
the only possible interpretation of that paragraph in the preamble was that the
Council (unanimously) considered that the earlier resolution was still in force.
The principle that the authorization of force contained in resolution 678
could revive in the event of Iraqi violation of the ceasefire conditions in
resolution 687 was relied on by the United Kingdom and the United States
in January 1993.111 That action-and the legal justification advanced for itreceived support from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said:
The raid yesterday, and the forces that carried out the raid, have received a

mandate from the Security Council according to resolution 678 and the cause of
the raid was the violation by Iraq of resolution 687 concerning the ceasefire.
So, as the Secretary-General of the UN, I can say that this action was taken and

conforms to the resolutions
of the Security Council and conforms to the Charter
1 12
of the United Nations.

This principle was also invoked by the United Kingdom and1 the
13 United
States in December 1998 at the time of Operation Desert Fox.
The decision by the Council, in paragraph 1 of resolution 1441 (2002), that
Iraq was guilty of a continuing material breach of the conditions of resolution
687 (1991) showed that the conditions for the revival of the authority to use
force existed. The use of the term "material breach" in resolution 1441 was
particularly significant as it was the term that had been used by the Council at
the time of the 1993 recourse to force. The decision to grant Iraq a final
opportunity to comply, however, together with the requirement that any
failure on the part of Iraq to take that opportunity had to be reported to the
Council for consideration under paragraph 12 of resolution 1441, meant that
resolution 1441 did not automatically revive the authorization of military
action. 114 Nevertheless, the requirement in paragraph 12 of resolution 1441 that
the Council consider the matter, did not mean that no action could be taken
under resolution 678 unless the Council decided on such a course. As the British
government's statement on the legal basis for military action made clear:

11.

See, e.g., the statements by the U.K. government reproduced in 64 BRIT. Y.B.

L. 736 (1993).
112. IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 741-42 (Marc
Weller ed., Cambridge 1993).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. For criticism of this reliance on
resolution 678 see Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarisation:International Law and
the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
114. Hence the statements about there being no automaticity. See discussion supra note
108 and accompanying text. See also Foreign Secretary's statement, supra note 103, at para. 11.
INT'L

Had that been the intention, [resolution 1441] would have provided that the
Council would decide what needed to be done to restore international peace and
security, not that it would consider the matter. The choice of words was
deliberate; a proposal that there should be a requirement for a decision by the
Council, a position maintained by several members, was not adopted. Instead
the members of the Council opted for the1 formula that the Council must
consider the matter before any action is taken. 15

In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 1441, the Council did
consider the matter at several formal meetings and in numerous informal
consultations between its members. Those meetings and consultations
showed that the members of the Council were agreed that Iraq remained
in material breach of its disarmament obligations but disclosed that the
members were divided about what to do with the result that no decision
could be taken. In these circumstances, although it must be recognized
that others have taken a different view, the present writer believes that
those governments who resorted to force were right to conclude that they
could rely on the authorization of military action in resolution 678, read
together with resolutions 687 and 1441.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President
George W. Bush highlighted the importance of pre-empting attacks such
as the one that occurred on September 11, 2001. In doing so, he made
the following remark:
Some have said that we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when
have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on
notice before they strike. If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly
1 16
emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late.

This Article has sought to demonstrate that international law does not
require that States wait until it is too late but nor does it give a broad
general license for pre-emptive military action. The following conclusions
seem warranted:
(1) All States have the right of self-defense against an armed
attack, actual or imminent;
(2) There is, however, no right to take military action in selfdefense against a threat that is not imminent;
(3) In determining whether an attack is imminent, the gravity of
the threat and the means by which it would materialize in
115. See Foreign Secretary's statement, supra note 103, at para. 11.
116. President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html
(last visited
Mar. 3, 2003).
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violence are relevant considerations and mean that the concept of
imminence will vary from case to case;
(4) The Security Council can authorize States to use pre-emptive
military force against a threat to the peace in circumstances
where an attack is not yet imminent;
(5) The scope for pre-emptive action under the collective
security regime is therefore more extensive than under the right
of self-defense;
(6) Neither the right of self-defense nor the collective security
regime is confined to threats emanating from States.
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